ABSTRACT
Background:Responses to COVID-19 have invested heavily in science. How this science was used is therefore important. Our work extends existing knowledge on the use of science in the pandemic by capturing scientific advisers’ experiences in real time.Aims and objectives:Our aim was to present generalisable messages on key qualifications or difficulties involved in speaking of ‘following the science’.Methods:Ninety-three interviews with UK scientific advisors and government officials captured their activities and perceptions during the pandemic in real time. We also examined Parliamentary Select Committee transcripts and government documents. This material was analysed for thematic content.Findings and discussion:(1) Many scientists sought guidance from policymakers about their goals, yet the COVID-19 response demonstrated the absence of a clear steer, and a tendency to change course quickly;(2) many scientists did not want to offer policy advice, but rather to provide evidence;and (3) a range of knowledge informed the UK’s pandemic response: we examine which kinds were privileged, and demonstrate the absence of clarity on how government synthesised the different forms of evidence being used.Conclusions:Understanding the reasons for a lack of clarity about policy goals would help us better understand the use of science in policy. Realisation that policy goals sometimes alter rapidly would help us better understand the logistics of scientific advice. Many scientists want their evidence to inform policy rather than determine the options selected. Since the process by which evidence leads to decisions is obscure, policy cannot be said to be evidence-based.
ABSTRACT
Background The COVID-19 pandemic has posed severe challenges to policy makers in all countries: these include uncertainty about the science of the disease, its epidemiology, and public behaviour, coupled with the need to act fast. This real-time study was undertaken to capture UK Government scientific advisers' perceptions of how scientific advice worked and to learn lessons about what works best in a fast-moving response to a novel epidemic. Methods Regular semi-structured calls were recorded with ten prominent scientific advisers to elicit their roles in, and reactions to, the UK's COVID-19 response. Interviewees were recruited using the existing networks of the NIHR Health Protection Research Unit for Emerging and Zoonotic Infections. They were active in fields including biomedical research, modelling, and global health, and they included members of the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE). In pandemic conditions interviewing was opportunistic: one participant spoke to us almost every 1–2 weeks, others at longer intervals. Interviews were transcribed and coded using a published analytical framework for the study of policy decision-making. Findings 93 interviews were conducted between Feb 17, 2020, and July 22, 2021. We report interviewees' perceptions that scientific advice had not led to sufficiently rapid policy decisions, and that a lack of transparency was sapping public trust. Interviewees also drew attention to policy makers' failure in the early months of the pandemic to frame a policy goal, and the problems this posed for giving scientific advice. It also became clear that scientific advisers and policy makers operated in different intellectual worlds, and that useful advice was most likely to be given when individuals could span this gap and understand the agendas of each group. Interpretation These findings provide empirical information about how science advice has worked, uncovering power dynamics and business processes that are not otherwise well understood. We argue that politicians abdicated responsibility by their early “follow the science” rhetoric, later renegotiated. The study would be strengthened if the perceptions of policy makers were also included. We requested interviews with eight policy makers, who declined due to unavailability. Funding UK Research and Innovation—National Institute for Health Research.